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Résumé / Abstract
Cet article étudie les conditions requises pour l’agrégation, la séparation
de portefeuille et la complétude effective des allocations compétitives dans les
modèles d’équilibre général avec marchés incomplets où les agents ont des
préférences et des distributions de dotations initiales générales. Nous montrons que
ces propriétés sont distinctes. Les demandes peuvent agréger sans pour autant
satisfaire la propriété de séparation de portefeuille et inversement. La séparation de
portefeuille implique la complétude effective, tandis que l’agrégation ne l’implique
pas. Les conséquences de ces propriétés pour la structure des équilibres sont
discutées, et des généralisations du CAPM, du CAPM de consommation et du
CAPM avec richesse non négociée émergent de l’analyse.
This paper studies the conditions for aggregation, portfolio
separation and effective completeness of competitive allocations in general
equilibrium models with incomplete markets in which agents have general
preference and endowment distributions. We show that these properties are
distinct. Demands may aggregate yet may fail to exhibit fund separation and
conversely. Fund separation implies effective completeness while aggregation
does not. The implications of these properties for the structure of equilibria are
discussed, and generalizations of the CAPM, the consumption CAPM and the
CAPM with nonmarketed wealth emerge from the analysis.
Mots Clés : Agrégation, efficience, séparation de portefeuille, marchés
incomplets, préférences générales, dotations non-marchandées
Keywords : Aggregation, Efficiency, Mutual Fund Separation, Incomplete
Markets, General Preferences, Nontraded Endowments
JEL : D52, G11, G12
1 1. Introduction
For several decades economists have attempted to characterize the structure and the
behaviour of asset prices in competitive financial markets.  The sole assumptions
of rational, maximizing behaviour of agents and of perfectly competitive markets,
however, impose very few restrictions on the aggregate demand function
(Sonnenschein (1974), Debreu (1974), Mantel (1976); also Bottazzi and Hens
(1996), Gottardi and Hens (1996) for an extension to incomplete markets), and
hence on the relationship between asset prices and the "fundamentals" of the
economy.  This has stimulated an interest in more specialized economies in which
the aggregate demand exhibits some structure, such as economies in which
aggregation holds (a representative agent can be constructed), or mutual fund
separation obtains.
When markets are complete a whole set of results can be obtained without special
assumptions.  For instance, arbitrage arguments produce explicit valuation formulas
for various types of derivative securities such as options.  The assumption that all
risks are marketed, however, is very strong.  It is then of interest to identify
conditions under which markets are effectively complete, i.e. equilibria exhibit the
same properties as when markets are complete.
In this paper we study the conditions for aggregation, portfolio separation and
effective completeness in a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets in
which agents have general preference and endowment distributions.  Prior literature
has mainly focused on the choice problem of agents with von Neumann-
Morgenstern (vNM) preferences and endowments only at the beginning of their
lives.  In this setting these three properties hold under the same conditions, i.e. when
utility functions belong to the HARA class and are identical up to, at most, a
translation factor (Cass and Stiglitz (1970), Rubinstein (1974), Milne (1979)).  In
our more general setting, however, the properties are distinct.  Demands may
aggregate yet may fail to exhibit fund separation and conversely.  Fund separation
implies effective completeness of the asset market while aggregation does not, i.e.
Pareto efficiency may fail even if an economy aggregates.  The implications of
aggregation and fund separation for the properties of equilibria are discussed; useful
extensions of traditional asset pricing models are obtained.
The next section of the paper describes the economy.  Section three characterizes
the set of economies which aggregate and studies the implications for asset pricing.
Section 4 considers portfolio separation and examines its relationship with
aggregation.  In section 5 effective completeness is discussed and its relation to
aggregation and fund separation assessed.
  Throughout the paper vectors are column vectors, though for convenience they are written as row1
vectors.  The operator " ’ " is used to denote the transpose of a vector or matrix when there is ambiguity.
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2. The Economy
Economic activity extends over two periods, dates 0 and 1.  The uncertainty is
represented by a finite set of states of nature S = {1,...,S}, with generic element s.
Uncertainty resolves at date 1.
  A single perishable commodity is available at date zero and in each of the future
states of nature.  A commodity bundle is c = (c ; c , s = 1,...,S).  Assets are traded0 1s 1
in the first period (date 0) and pay off in the second (date 1).  There are A (real)
assets.  The matrix of asset payoffs (denominated in units of the consumption good)
is R with S rows and A columns.
Assumption 2.1:  R has full column rank.
A portfolio is a vector x0ú ; unlimited short-sales are allowed.A
There is a finite number of investors, h 0 H / {1,...,H}.  The preferences of investor
h are represented by a utility function U  defined over ú .  Investor h's endowmenth S+1+
of the consumption good is e  / (e ,e )0ú  where e  / (e  , s=1,...,S).  Theh h h S+1 h h0 1 + 1 1s
endowment vector e  has a unique decompositionh1
(1) e  = (e )  + Rx ,h h h1 1 2Sp[R] e
where Rx  is the orthogonal projection of e  on the column span of R, Sp[R], andh he 1
(e  )  is the orthogonal projection of e  on 2Sp[R], the orthogonal complementh h1 2Sp[R] 1
of Sp[R].  Without loss of generality we can assume that the agents have no initial
endowment of assets (asset endowments can be thought of as a component of Rx );he
the aggregate supply of assets then equals zero.  We assume,
Assumption 2.2:  For all h0H, e >0.h0
Assumption 2.3:  For all h0H, the utility function U : ú 6ú is twice continuouslyh S+1+
differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave.  For all c0ú ,S+1++
closure{y0ú : U (y)>U (c)} d ú .S+1 h h S+1+ ++
A collection of endowments is e / (e : h0H); a collection of utilities is U / (U :h h
h0H).  An economy is a collection of endowments, utilities and a matrix of asset
3payoffs (e,U,R).  In what follows the payoff matrix R is fixed, and we consider the
space of economies = / WqV  with generic element >=(e,U), where W is the setH
of endowment distributions satisfying Assumption 2.2, V /q V, where V is theH Hh =1
set of utility functions satisfying Assumption 2.3 and q is the cartesian product.  Let
>(U) / {>0=: U=(U : h0H)}d= denote the collection of economies with a givenh
distribution of preferences.
Asset prices at date 0 are p0ú , normalized in terms of the good.  Individual budgetA
sets are,
(p,e ) = {c0ú ,x0ú : c  + px # e , c  # e  + Rx}, h0H.h S+1 A h h+ 0 0 1 1
Agents demand commodities and assets so as to maximize utility subject to their
budget constraint
(2) max  U (c)  s.t.  (c,x) 0 (p,e ), h0H.c,x h h
Asset prices do not allow for arbitrage if and only if, Rx>0 Y px>0.  This condition
is equivalent to p0 / {p0ú : p = R'. for some .0ú }.  For p0, >0= a solutionA S++
to the individual optimization problem exists and is unique, for all h (Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis (1986)).  Moreover, the individual demand for consumption and
assets (c ,x )(p,e ), h0H, is continuous and differentiable.h h h
A consumption allocation is an array of consumption bundles (...,c ,...); anh
asset allocation is an array of portfolios (...,x ,...).  A competitive equilibrium is ah
set of prices and a consumption-asset allocation such that at these prices
consumption and asset holdings satisfy (2) and markets clear: G c  = G e  and G xh h hh h h
= 0.
Under Assumptions 2.1-2.3 a competitive equilibrium exists.  Let p(>) denote the
set of equilibrium prices of economy >, >0=.
Our objective is to characterize the set of economies for which the properties of
aggregation, fund separation and effective completeness hold.  For Arrow-Debreu
economies, in which agents optimize their preferences over consumption subject
to a single budget constraint, the issue of aggregation has been widely investigated.
With incomplete markets but a single commodity the agents' optimization problem
(2) is equivalent to the problem of maximizing the indirect utility over date 0
consumption and portfolio holdings subject to a unique budget constraint.  The
novelty of our approach consists in deriving the conditions for aggregation in terms
of the direct preferences over consumption.  We can then evaluate the effects of the
presence of nonspanned endowments, which is the most important aspect of market
incompleteness in this context.  Similarly fund separation will be investigated as a
property of the demand for current and future consumption (and our results show
that this is the relevant notion in a general equilibrium model).
When there are multiple commodities at each date (L>1), the individual decision
4problem also includes a nontrivial decision to allocate a given income in each state
among the various commodities.  The conditions for aggregation derived in the
paper for the case L=1 apply to the indirect utility over income in each state, to
obtain conditions for aggregation when L>1.  This indirect utility is the result of the
standard problem of allocating a given income to the consumption of multiple goods
in the same state with a complete set of spot markets.  The solution to this problem
has well known properties.  Similar results hold for fund separation.
3. Aggregation
We characterize the set of economies which aggregate in the following sense,
Definition 3.1:  We say that a collection of economies >(U)d= aggregates locally
at the price p  if and only if for any economy (e',U)0>(U) there exists an agent with*
preferences U0V such that the property
(3) G (c ,x )(p;e ) = (c,x)(p;e) 0 argmax  U(c) s.t. (c,x)0(p,e),h c,xh h h
holds for all (p,e)0N (p ,e')1(qW), where e=G e  and N (p ,e') is a g-ball around
g h g
* h *
(p ,e').*
Remark 3.1:  This definition of aggregation is essentially identical to the notions
considered by Antonelli (1886) and Gorman (1953) under certainty; Rubinstein
(1974) and Milne (1979) examine this concept in a setting with uncertainty, vNM
preferences and endowments in the initial period only.  Definition 3.1 imposes
strong requirements: the aggregate demand must not only have the properties of an
individual demand function (satisfy (3)), but also be independent of local changes
in the distribution of endowments e.  The local aspect of this definition is motivated
by our interest in the structure of equilibria: the only relevant aspect is whether
aggregation holds in a neighbourhood of equilibrium prices.
Definition 3.1 implies that, in the space of economies = = WqV , we seekH
restrictions on the collection of utilities U, leaving the endowment distribution free
(i.e. we seek subsets of the form WqI(p ), where I(p )fV ).  When markets are* * H
incomplete, however, the requirements of this definition will prove overly strong:
aggregation holds for a much smaller class of economies than when markets are
complete (see claim (ii) in Theorem 3.1 below).  On the other hand, if we restrict
attention to the subset of economies for which agents' endowments are spanned by
the existing assets the incompleteness of the market does not interfere with the
validity of aggregation (see claim (i) in Theorem 3.1).  To define this weaker notion,
  It is immediate to verify that aggregation also holds if (IH) and the weaker condition (" +e )0Sp[R]2 h h1 1
are verified (thus, e  need not be in Sp[R]).h1
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let W  be the subset of W satisfying the following condition,sp
(SP) e 0Sp[R] h0H.h1
i.e. such that all the agents' endowments lie in the assets' span (therefore are
marketed).  Similarly, let =  / W qV .  We then say that a collection of economiessp sp H
> (U)=>(U)1=  with spanned endowments aggregates locally at prices p  if thesp sp *
conditions of Definition 3.1 hold, restricted to the subset = .sp
The following restriction on the agents' preferences plays a crucial role in the
analysis:
(IH) e, N (c (p ,e ))dú ," 0ú , and V: ú 6ú homothetic such that 
g ++ +
h * h S+1 h S+1 S+1
U (c ) = V(" +c ) c 0N (c (p ,e )), for h0H.h h h h h h * h
g
If (IH) holds, we say that agents' preferences are almost identically locally
homothetic at p . *
Theorem 3.1:  Suppose that Assumptions 2.1-2.3 hold.
(i) The collection of economies > (U) with spanned endowments aggregates locallysp
at p , if and only if (IH) holds (preferences are almost identically locally homothetic*
at p ), and " 0Sp[R] h0H.  * h 21
(ii) The collection of economies >(U) aggregates locally at p  if and only if*
preferences are almost identically locally quadratic at p :*
e, N (c (p ,e ))dú  and Q positive definite: U (c ) =
g +
h * h S+1 h h
- ½(" +c )'Q(" +c ), h0H,h h h h
where -Q(" +c ) > 0 over the relevant range of c .h h h
Proof of Theorem 3.1:
Sufficiency:  (i) Since preferences satisfy (IH), U (c ) = V(" +c ) where V( ) ish h h h .
homothetic in the relevant range of c .  Moreover, the assumption (" ,e )0Sp[R]h h h
implies the existence of a pair (x ,x ) such that "  = Rx  and e  = Rx .  It followsh h h h h h
" e 1 " 1 e
that the individual optimization problem (2) is equivalent to,
(4) max  V(" +c ; R(x +x +x ))c,x 0 0 e "h h h h h
s.t.  " +c +p(x +x +x ) = " +e +p(x +x )h h h h h h h h h0 0 e " 0 0 e "
c  $ 0h0
R(x +x +x ) $ Rx .h h h he " "
  D U  is the matrix of the second derivatives of U  with respect to c  and c , i,j=0,13 2 h h h hij i j
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Thus, under the assumptions of the Theorem the agents' indirect utility over date
zero consumption and asset holdings is locally homothetic and identical across
agents.  Aggregation follows from a standard argument (see Gorman (1953),
Chipman (1974)).
(ii) With quadratic preferences the first order conditions for agent h's optimization
problem (2) are,
(5) Q (" +c )p = [Q (" +c )]'R1 -1h h h h
(6) c  + px  = eh h h0 0
(7) c  = e  + Rx  h h h1 1
where Q  is the first row of Q and Q  is the matrix composed of the remaining S1 -1
rows.  It is easy to verify that the solution to (5)-(7) is linear in the endowment
vector e  and that the derivative of demand with respect to e  is identical acrossh h
agents.  Aggregation again follows.
Necessity:  Definition 3.1 implies that a necessary condition for (local) aggregation
is that the derivatives with respect to date zero income,3
 Mc /Me      h h0 0
  =  M(D U ) P [ P'(D U ) P] ,2 h -1 2 h -1 -1
 Mc /Me         h h1 0
where
 D U        D U 'R       1  0   1  2 h 2 h00 01
        D U  /             ,   M /   ,   P /       ,2 h  R' D U    R' D U R    0  R    p  2 h 2 h01 11
are identical across agents (at (p ,e)).  This implies that the matrix of second*
derivatives D U  must be the same, up to a scalar, for all h0H.  When endowments2 h
are nonspanned this holds only if D U  is independent of c  (quadratic utility2 h h
function).  When endowments are spanned this holds only if utility functions satisfy
(IH); the vectors (c +" ) are then all collinear.Íh h
If Assumption 2.2 is modified to allow for preferences which are quasi concave (not
strictly) in first period consumption (denote this weaker Assumption as 2.2') the
conditions for aggregation become,
7Corollary 3.1:  Suppose that Assumptions 2.1, 2.2' and 2.3 hold.  
(i) Aggregation holds (locally at p ) for all collections of economies with spanned*
endowments > (U) if U (c )="  c +U (c ), for some arbitrary " >0 and some U sp 0 0 1 1 0 1h h h h h h h h
such that U  satisfies Assumption 2.2', h0H.h
(ii) Aggregation holds (locally at p ) for all collections of economies {(e,U)0=:*
U ="  c+U (c ) where (U : h0H) satisfies the analogue of (IH) and (" +e )  =h h h h h h h h0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2<R>
8 0 for some (0,8 )0ú xú, h0H}.h h S
Proof of Corollary 3.1:  Under the conditions of claim (ii) of the Corollary, the first
order conditions for agent h's optimization problem become,
(8) p=DV (8 0+R(x +x +x ))R1 e "h h h h
for some 8 0ú, where DV  denotes the gradient of V .  Homotheticity of V ( )h 1 1 1 .
implies that the solution of (8) is (x +x +x )(8 )  = f(p), where f(p) is independenth h h h -1e "
of h.  Aggregation follows.  
Under the conditions of claim (i) equation (8) becomes, p=DU (R(x +x +x ))R.h h h h1 e "
We conclude that x +x +x  = f (p).  Again, aggregation follows.Íh h h he "
This Corollary shows again that the conditions for aggregation when the endowment
has a nonspanned component are very strong.  On the other hand, with spanned
endowments quasi-linear preferences imply aggregation as with complete markets.
What are the consequences of aggregation?
(i) Clearly it implies (if it holds at every equilibrium of an economy) that the
equilibrium is unique and that the Jacobian of the aggregate demand at equilibrium
is negative semidefinite (with the standard comparative statics implications).  It also
implies that nonspanned, zero net supply assets can be priced uniquely.  Thus
financial innovation (opening a new market in any of these assets) has no price
effects; however, with nonspanned endowments it affects, generically, the
equilibrium allocation and leads to a Pareto improvement.
(ii) More importantly, Theorem 3.1 yields a generalization of the standard CAPM
(Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1969)), the consumption CAPM
(Breeden (1979)) and the CAPM with nonmarketed wealth (Mayers (1972)).
Let x  denote the market portfolio (i.e. Rx  is the spanned component of aggregatee e
endowment e), p  its price and r  the random variable describing the rate of returne e˜
Rx /p .  Similarly, for any distribution of preferences satisfying (IH) define r  ande e "˜
p  the return and the price of the portfolio x  (i.e. Rx  is the spanned component of
" " "
the aggregate coefficient " =G " ).  Also, let r  denote the rate of return of the1 h 1 fh
riskless asset, with payoff 1 = (1,...,1) 0 ú .  It is easily verified that,S
(9) Er˜&rf ' &cov(
D1V("0%e0,r˜"p"%r˜epe)
D0V("0%e0,r˜"p"%r˜epe)
,r˜)Srf ' ˆ$[Er˜ e&rf]
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q = (q ,...,q ) / [D V("+e)/D V("+e)]([D V("+e)/D V("+e)]1) ,1 S 1 0 1 0 -1
where DV = (D V,D V) is the utility gradient, is a probability measure. 0 1
Since " +e  = r p  + r˜ p  + ("˜ +e˜ ) , q is a function of r˜ , linear when V( ) is˜1 1 " " e e 1 1 2<R> e˜ ˜ .
quadratic.  Let  r  be the rate of return on an arbitrary asset (whether spanned or˜
not).  We have,
Corollary 3.2 (generalized CAPM):  If aggregation holds at equilibrium:
(i) under the conditions of Theorem 3.1(i) (i.e. with spanned endowments) r satisfies˜
the following generalized version of the consumption CAPM,
where expectations are taken with respect to the uniform probability measure, and
$  / cov(D V/D V,r)/cov(D V/D V,r );^ 1 0 1 0 e˜ ˜
(ii) under the conditions of Theorem 3.1(ii) returns satisfy a generalized version of
the CAPM with nonmarketed (nonspanned) endowments,
(10) Er-r  = 8cov(Q ("+e),r˜) = $[Er -r 1] ˜ f -1 e f˜
where 8/-S[1Q ("+e)]  and where $ / cov(Q ("+e),r)/cov(Q ("+e),r ) represents
-1 -1 -1 e
-1 ˜ ˜
the vector of (generalized) betas of the securities.
Proof of Corollary 3.2:  Under the assumptions stated the price of an asset with
payoff r0ú  (marketed or not) is, p = [D V("+e)/D V("+e)]r.  In particular theS 1 0
riskless asset price is 1/r  = [D V("+e)/D V("+e)]1.  Asset prices can then bef 1 0
written as, p = (r )  qR; thus r  = SE[qr˜].  Since E[q˜r˜] = cov(q˜,r˜) + E[q˜]E[r˜] andf f-1 ˜
SE[q]=1, (9) holds.  Specialization to quadratic utility yields (10).Í˜
As Corollary 3.2 shows, aggregation implies that traded assets as well as unspanned
assets in zero net supply satisfy a CAPM-like relationship: when endowments and
translation factors are spanned the beta is a nonlinear function of the return of the
market portfolio, r, (as well as of r); when endowments (and translation factors) are˜e "˜
nonspanned and aggregation holds the beta is a ratio of two expressions which are
  An alternative approach identifies the class of distributions of asset returns which yield separation for4
arbitrary preferences (Ross (1978)).
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linear functions of r  and r˜ , but also depend on the nonmarketed component˜e "
(" +e ) .1 1 2<R>
4.  Fund Separation
In this section we consider the property of portfolio separation defined as,
Definition 4.1:  A collection of economies >(U)d= exhibits M-fund separation,
locally at p , if and only if for any e' there exists a linear subspace of ú ,* S
 M(p)dSp[R], with M/dim(M(p))<A such that,
(11) c (p;e )0M(p) h, (p,e)0N (p ,e').h h *1 g
This definition requires that the consumption demands of all agents in the economy
lie in a M-dimensional subspace of Sp[R] which is independent of local changes in
the distribution of endowments,
(12) c (p;e ) = R[G x (p)8 (p;e )], (p,e)0N (p ,e').h h M h h *1 m=1 m m g
Remark 4.1:  Fund separation (in particular 2-fund separation) was originally
discussed as a property of the portfolio demand of an agent in a mean-variance
setting (Markowitz (1959), Tobin (1958)).  The class of vNM preferences yielding
fund separation was subsequently studied by various authors (notably, Cass and
Stiglitz (1970), Brennan and Kraus (1976)).   Our definition differs from this4
literature in two respects.  First, fund separation is stated as a property of the
demand for date one consumption.  Any claim on fund separation as a property of
the assets' demand would in fact not be invariant to endowment reallocations
between dates zero and one which do not modify the agents' budget sets and hence
their consumption demands.  Second, fund separation is stated as a property of an
economy with many agents.  This is again motivated by our interest in its
implications for equilibrium prices and allocations.
Theorem 4.1:  Suppose that Assumptions 2.1-2.3 hold.
(i) The collection of economies > (U) with spanned endowments exhibits M-fundsp
separation locally at p , for M<A:*
10
i1. if U satisfies (IH) (i.e. preferences are almost identically locally
homothetic at p ), "0Sp[R] h and M-1 is the dimensionality of the space* h1
generated by the vectors {" , h0H},h1
i2. alternatively, if, for all h, U (c ) = U (c )+U (c ) where U  is arbitraryh h h h h h h0 0 1 1 0
and (U: h0H) satisfies the analogue of (IH), " 0Sp[R] h and M-1 is theh h1 1
dimensionality of the span of {" , h0H},h1
(ii) with arbitrary nonspanned endowments M-fund separation fails.
Proof of Theorem 4.1:  (i1)  From the proof of Theorem 3.1, when e 0Sp[R] andh1
(IH) holds we have (" +c ,x +x +x ) = (d (p;e ," );d (p;e ," )) where (d ( );d ( ))h h h h h h h h h0 0 e " 0 1 0 1. .
are the solutions of (4).  
Also c (p;e ) = R[d (p;e ," )-x ]0Sp[Rd (p;G e ,G " );Rx ], (p,e)0N (p ,e'). h h h h h h h h *1 1 " 1 h h " g
 Thus M-fund separation holds with M(p) / Sp[Rd (p;G e ,G " );Rx ,...,Rx ], 1 h h " "h h 1 H
independent of h and of local changes in endowments.
(i2)  Under the assumptions of claim i2. the individual choice problem can be
rewritten as follows:
(3') max x U (c ) + V (R(x +x +x )) c 0 0 1 e "0,
h h h h h
s.t.  c  + px  # eh h h0 0
c  $ 0h0
R(x +x +x ) $ Rx .h h h he " "
where V : ú 6ú is homothetic (and independent of h).  It is easy to verify that1 +S
solutions of (3') satisfy,
x (p;e ," ) = [e  + p(x +x ) - c (p;e +p(x +x ))] f(p) - (x +x ),h h h h h h h h h h h h0 e " 0 0 e " e "
where f: ú 6ú  and c (p;e +p(x +x ) are defined by:A A h h h h0 0 e "
f(p) / argmax  V (Ry)  s.t. py = 1.y 1
c (p;e +p(x +x )) / argmax  {U (c) + V ((e +p(x +x )-c)Rf(p))}.h h h h h h h h0 0 e " c 0 1 0 e "
Hence c (p;e ," ) = e  + Rx (p;e ," ) is spanned by Rf(p) and Rx   .M-fundh h h h h h h h1 1 "
separation follows.
(ii) The result follows from the definition of M-fund separation (since e óSp[R]h1
implies c óSp[R]).Íh
Remark 4.2:  1.  The proof of Theorem 4.1 reveals that consumption demand has
the structure,
(13) c (p;e ) = R[x (p)8 (p;e ) + G x 8 ], (p,e)0N (p ,e').h h h h M h *1 1 1 m=2 m m g
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The first fund is common across agents.  Its composition depends on the agents'
preferences (in fact only on their common component V) and on p; the demand for
this fund varies with individual wealth and prices.  The other funds depend only on
the "  components of the agents' preferences and not on p; the demand for theseh
funds is also independent of p.  It is possible to show that the conditions stated in
Theorem 4.1 are also necessary for fund separation as characterized in (13).
However, we cannot claim that they are necessary for M-fund separation as defined
in Definition 4.1 and described in (12).
2.  For the case in which "  is state-independent for all h Theorem 4.1 generalizesh
the results of Cass and Stiglitz (1970) on monetary separation to arbitrary
preferences.  On the other hand the preferences in Cass and Stiglitz (1970) which
exhibit general two-fund separation do not satisfy (13).  This result of Cass and
Stiglitz was extended by Lewbel and Perraudin (1995) who use the idea that
separation is a lower rank property of the agents' demand functions.  With complete
markets the lower rank property holds for a class of preferences which is strictly
larger than the class of homothetic preferences (Lewbel (1989)).  With incomplete
markets Lewbel and Perraudin (1995) provide conditions on the indirect utility
function W(R,p,e) under which this lower rank property holds.  The problem,
however, is that this indirect utility depends not only on the original preferences of
the agents over consumption, but also on the assets' payoffs and the distribution of
endowments.  Any fund separation claim in this setting thus fails to be robust with
respect to perturbations in the assets' payoffs (or the endowments' distribution).
3.  More importantly, as we will show in section 5, the characterization of fund
separation in (13) has important implications for efficiency which do not extend to
economies satisfying only (12) (for instance the economies satisfying general two-
fund separation identified by Cass and Stiglitz).
Theorems 3.1 and 4.2 show that there is no systematic relation between the
properties of aggregation and fund separation: aggregation does not imply, nor is
implied by separation.
i.  with nonspanned endowments fund separation fails but aggregation
holds when preferences are quadratic of the form 
U (c)  =  - ½(" +c )'Q(" +c ). The same is true if (IH) holds and h h h h h
(" +e )0Sp[R] and if dim Sp[(" ) ] > A.h h h H1 1 1 h =1
ii.  In case (i.2) of Theorem 4.2 fund separation holds even if the utility
over time zero consumption is arbitrary (and hence aggregation fails).
The reason for the discrepancy between these properties is as follows.  Aggregation
holds only if the derivatives of consumption demands with respect to endowments
are locally constant and identical across agents.  On the other hand fund separation
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(as characterized in (13)) requires that all agents' date one consumption vectors
belong to the asset span and their derivatives with respect to date zero savings be
locally constant and identical across agents.  Hence fund separation may hold (as in
(ii) above) when savings depend nonlinearly on endowments, while it fails when the
demand for date one consumption is linear in endowments but endowments are not
in the span (as in the quadratic case).
Fund separation and aggregation also have different implications.  Under the
conditions of Theorem 4.1 a version of the CAPM as in Corollary 3.2 still holds, but
we cannot say that there is a unique equilibrium or identify the Jacobian's
properties.  Other implications are discussed in section 5.
There is, however, a "core case" in which both aggregation and fund separation
hold: with spanned endowments and (IH) (almost identical locally homothetic
preferences) the vectors of consumption demands are locally affine functions of the
endowments with common proportionality factor.  If we restrict attention to vNM
preferences, i.e. U (c) / E[u (c)], the "core case" reduces to the standard conclusionh h ˜
in the literature (see, e.g., Cass and Stiglitz (1970), Rubinstein (1974), Milne
(1979)).
Corollary 4.1:  Suppose that Assumptions 2.1-2.3 hold and that preferences are
vNM.  Then aggregation holds locally at p , for all collections of economies with*
spanned endowments > (U) if and only if for all h U  belongs to the Hyperbolicsp h
Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) class, U  is identical across agents up to at mosth
the (now constant) translation factor and a riskless asset is marketed.  Under these
conditions 2-fund separation also holds.
5.  Effective Completeness of the Asset Market
Let J denote the collinearity of two vectors.  Effective completeness is defined as
follows,
Definition 5.1:  The asset market is effectively complete for the economy >0= if and
only if for all equilibrium prices p0p(>): DU (c (p;e )) J DU (c (p;e )), h,h' 0 H.h h h h' h' h'
Remark 5.1:  Effective completeness requires that at every competitive equilibrium
the vectors of the marginal rates of substitution between date one and date zero
consumption are identical across agents, i.e. that the equilibrium allocation is Pareto
optimal.  When A=S markets are complete and the condition above is always
satisfied.  Hence markets are also effectively complete.  On the other hand, when
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A<S, markets are not, generically, effectively complete in the general space of
economies =.
When markets are effectively complete, all nonspanned zero net supply assets can
be priced uniquely; moreover, financial innovation has no effects on the equilibrium
allocation and prices.  Our next Theorem shows that effective completeness holds
under the conditions obtained for fund separation.
Theorem 5.1:  Suppose that Assumptions 2.1-2.3 hold.  Under the conditions of
Theorem 4.1 the market is effectively complete.
Proof of Theorem 5.1:  From the proof of Theorem 4.1 (i1) we have c +"  Jh h1 1
Rd (p;G e ,G " ).  Under (IH), U (c ) = V(" +c ).  It follows that the vectors of1 h hh h h h h h
marginal utilities are identical across agents.  In case (i2) c +"  J Rf(p) so that DUh h h1 1 1
= DV (Rf(p)); also from the first order conditions we get DU  = DV 'Rf(p) for all1 0 1h
h.  Therefore the utility gradients are identical across agents at all equilibrium
prices.Í
On the other hand aggregation does not imply effective completeness.  For instance
under the conditions of Theorem 3.1(ii) (i.e. nonspanned endowments and quadratic
preferences) aggregation holds but the equilibrium is not Pareto optimal.  This
confirms that welfare judgements cannot be based on aggregation.  This was shown
by Jerison (1984) through an example of an economy under certainty with diverse
homothetic preferences and collinear endowments.  Our results show the wider
validity of this phenomenon: under the conditions of Theorem 3.1(ii) it is easy to
find economies which aggregate (even with identical homothetic preferences) in
which welfare comparisons across equilibria yield opposite results for the
representative agent and all the agents in the economy.
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